Use of RFID and NFC Scanning Mechanisms to Replace Current Magnetic MetroCard Designs

David Diop, Kareem Ibrahim, and Vincent Sangpo

The City College of New York

 

Summary

The New York City public transit system has numerous pitfalls, especially concerning fare rides and payments. The current implementation of fare payment for NYC public transportation is the MetroCard system that relies on magnetic strip records to store information and payments. This system has proven unreliable over the past few years since its introduction, as these magnetic strips are stored on flimsy cards where if the magnetic part of the card is scratched or bent then the entire card is rendered useless and untenable.

Radio frequency identification systems, or RFID, proves to be a suitable replacement for the current implementation of MetroCards. RFID is a way that certain devices and cards can be marked with a unique ID number that, when scanned, can transmit information. This is an innovative method that would allow commuters on the NYC public transit system to be able to use their phones or credit card like devices to access the subway. Specifically, Near Field Communication (NFC), is the subset of this technology that works best for this kind of system.

In this proposal, we show that RFIDs are a safer and more reliable alternative to MetroCards. Consistent research is finding new ways to secure this system and to allow riders to have a safer way to store their cards that contain private balances. For an estimated cost of $3.63 million, RFID scanners will be placed as a supplement to MetroCard scanners at various turnstiles over the next few years. Once every turnstile in the NYC subway system is fitted with a scanner, there will be a slow roll out of MetroCard readers. The end result is a subway where there only exists safe and reliable RFID scanners.

 

Author’s Note:

This proposal was prepared for English 210, taught by professor Susan Delamare.

Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………… p. 3

Objectives…………………………………………………………………………………… …p. 4

Preliminary Literature Review……………………………………………………………… …p. 5

Technical Description……………………………………………………………………….. …p. 8

Budget………………………………………………………………………………….……. p. 14

References…………………………………………………………………………………… p. 15

Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………… p. 18

 

List of Illustrations

Fig. 1 A standard MTA Metrocard…………………………………………………….p. 5

Fig. 2 Showcase of electronic pickpocketing……………………………………….… p. 7

Fig. 3 A test-e-reader at the Bowling Green subway station……………………….… p. 8

Fig. 4 The RFID Response System………………………………………………….. p. 9

Fig. 5 The Internals of an RFID Card………………………………………….…… p. 10

Fig. 6A Home page of the myMTA App…………………………………………….… p. 11

Fig. 6B The Extension of the MyMTA App……………………………………..…… p. 11

Fig. 7 Possible NFC card for fare payment……………………………………….… p. 12

Fig. 8A Ticketing machine that accepts both Metrocards and contactless fare………. p. 13

Fig. 8B Potential configuration of the current Metrocard vending machine for NFC card Payment……………………………………………………………………… p. 13

 

Introduction

The New York City public transportation system has existed for many decades to meet the transportation needs of its patrons. Over that time, the system has undergone many changes and advancements to adapt to changing times. One aspect in particular that has undergone numerous changes is the way in which people pay for their fares. In the past century, people have gone from using tickets, to nickels, to tokens as a means to access the subway (Barron, 2017). This trend of advancement has continued up to the MetroCards that are used today.

MetroCards work via a magnetic strip that can be read and rewritten. By swiping your MetroCard into a compatible device, one can pay a fare or add money to their card. This is the system that’s been in place since the 1990’s. However, as time moves forward, the MetroCard’s shortcomings have become more apparent and ideas have arisen as to how this system can be improved through the use of modern technology. That is the purpose of this proposal. We are suggesting that the MetroCard be replaced with a system that utilizes radio-frequency identification (RFID) to pay from and add to a user’s bank account.

Items that utilize RFID technology are tagged with microchips, that store data in the form of ID numbers. Said data can then be read wirelessly, when in range of a reader, and then processed by an external system (Lehpamer, 2012). We specifically intend on using a subset of RFID technology known as Near-Field Communication (NFC), that allows for communication between two tagged devices. In the case of public transportation, this allows communication to be done by simply waving a personal device over a reader. One’s card’s data would then be sent directly to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), who can deduct one’s fare from their bank account. Such technology would greatly improve on the MetroCard by shortening lines and removing the need to replace or refill cards. By modernizing New York City transportation, we hope to make the commutes of many people simpler and more efficient.

Objectives

The primary goal we have in this proposal is to completely revamp the MTA’s fare payment system in the near future. Within the next decade, the new fare payment system should utilize RFID/NFC technology. This technology may vary in its forms from credit card chip readers to utilizing mobile phone applications. Our proposal will address the specific method in which we hope to implement RFID and NFC technology into the NYC subway system through these objectives:

1. Analysis of RFID technology and how it operates.
2. Applications of NFC technology for contactless fare payment systems.
3. Examination of the budget and timeline for implementing NFC-based technology into the NYC subway system.

With all of these factors considered and researched, we can make an effective conclusion on how such an overhaul may take place in the near future.

 

Preliminary Literature Review

The main problem that lies with the use of MetroCards is their unreliability. MetroCards rely on the black magnetic strip located on the card that stores the card’s data (see figure 1). To enter an MTA subway, the user must swipe their MetroCard through a turnstile. Thus, this leaves the system with many problems. Turnstile readers are typically slow and poor at reading MetroCards—often the user has to re-swipe their card to go on the subway. If the magnetic strip on a MetroCard is damaged, scratched, or bent in any way, then the card itself may be rendered useless. All MetroCard purchases are one time transactions where the purchase information is located solely on that MetroCard. Therefore, if a MetroCard is thrown out, then all of the user’s purchases on that card are eliminated. Thus, this leads into the benefits of replacing MetroCards with an RFID system.

Figure 1- A standard MTA Metrocard Original photograph production

RFID systems are a relatively recent technology with discoveries dating back to the 1920’s (“A Brief History”, n.d.). Research hit a high in the WWII era and continued to expand well into the 20th century. There now exists further studies into RFID mechanisms thus allowing these systems to be more widely available and cheaper (“A Brief History”, n.d.).

Consistent research is being done on RFIDs to ensure further stability and safety of the systems implemented using this technology. One such research paper discusses the use of two way authentication to allow for safer use of RFID’s in remote educational learning environments (Baia, Lina, Wua, Yanga, Zheng, 2016). This protocol utilizes a hash based authentication utility—hash lock, that connects an RFID reader’s unique ID to a unique hash, thus allowing for secure connections to be created (Baia et. al., 2016). This form of research is indicative of the future implications an RFID fare payment system can provide allowing for easy access and use among New York City’s public transportation riders.

Another application of RFID research includes the use of neural networking behaviour predictions to predict the usage of an RFID card (Düzenli̇, 2015). This technology is able to predict a user’s card use on public transit and determine whether or not an RFID card has been cloned. This technology has shown to work in current public transit systems such as the Turkish public transportation architecture (Düzenli̇, 2015).

A study done on the Japanese public transit system which currently utilizes RFID’s represents the future implications an RFID based system could have (Schilpzand and van ‘t Hof, 2008). This paper was done in the spirit of recognizing the Internet of Things presence in modern day society. It was found that the use of RFID readers on public transit gave riders more of an attachment to their phones and cards, giving themselves more of a personal identity (Schilpzand and van ‘t Hof, 2008). The boundary between governmental advancements in technology pervades through the social and legal aspects of commuters daily lives.

The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) implemented a contactless fare payment system called Ventra cards. This system, however, is flawed. The information stored on the Ventra RFID chip is easily accessible to any RFID reader and susceptible to “electronic pickpockets” (Hilkevitch 2013). Electronic pickpockets occur when someone with an RFID scanner gets near someone with an RFID card, thus scanning and stealing the information on that card (Hilkevitch 2013). This can be seen in action in figure 2. In the RFID replacement of the metrocard, we can observe the Baia et. al. procedure of creating hash locks for every RFID card and we can verify if a card has been cloned using Düzenli̇’s method. Another tried and tested way of securing RFID cards is by using challenge-response authentication (“Prevent”, n.d.). This creates a specific link between the RFID card and the RFID reader at a turnstile that an attacker’s device would not have (“Prevent”, n.d.). These are all the ways the RFID cards replacing MetroCards can be secured. Different authentication methods and procedures may be tested in the testing installation timeline of this proposal (see Appendix B for more information).

Figure 2 – Showcase of electronic pickpocketing Reprinted from https://travelgenixx.com/blogs/news/how-to-avoid-electronic-pick-pocketing

Technical Description

Figure 3-A test-e-reader at the Bowling Green subway station. Adapted from “NYC is (very slowly) getting a more high-tech way to pay for subway rides,” by Andrew J. Hawkins, October 23, 2017, The Verge.  https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/23/16521456/nyc-mta-subway-bus-smartphone-fare-metrocard

 

Figure 3 depicts one test design that may be implemented in the future of our NFC system. As shown, there exists a typical MetroCard reader that accepts MetroCard swipes and a new NFC scanner system. This screen detects the NFC identification from any supported device—i.e. a card or a smartphone—and determines the eligibility of a rider to pass on to the subway platform. We are proposing the expansion of this system to accompany a rollout of NFC cards and an extension to the MyMTA app. Following are the ways that this system could function.

Figure 4 – The RFID Response System. Reprinted from “RFID Design Principles” by Harvey Lehpamer

Contactless fare payments using RFID involves a multi-step process. Figure 4 shows this process at which an RFID may interact with an external server. As a subset of RFID, the NFC readers will act in a similar fashion. Following is a description of the process shown in figure 4.

1. Tagged item

The tagged item is the actual RFID/NFC device. As seen in figure 5, there are four features that make up a tagged item: a chip, an antenna, the interconnect, and the substrate. The chip stores data, such as payment information, and is a normal semiconductor silicon based chip (“Dig”, n.d.). The antenna sends the radio signals to a receiver and is typically made of “metal strips of copper, aluminum, or silver” (“Dig”, n.d.). The interconnect is the intermediary connection between the data stored on the chip and the antenna. Lastly, the substrate consists of thin plastic that holds all of the components together (“Dig”, n.d.).

    Figure 5 – The Internals of an RFID Card Adapted from

      https://rfid4u.com/rfid-basics-resources/dig-deep-rfid-tags-construction/

 

1. Antenna

The antenna attached to the RFID reader accepts radio signals from an RFID/NFC tagged device. Like the RFID device, this antenna is made of thin metal wiring (“Dig”, n.d.). After receiving data from a tagged device, this antenna passes its information to the RFID reader.

1. RFID reader

The RFID reader is the interpreter in this system. This reader will be located inside the turnstile along with the antenna. Once the antenna passes a tagged device’s information to the reader, the reader interprets this data and sends it along to a web-enabled computer, or server (Lehpamer, 2012).

1. Web-enabled computer

A web-enabled computer represents any server based process that will accept information from an RFID reader. Once the RFID reader interprets the information from the tagged device, the server will process this information into a series of actions (Lehpamer, 2012). Regarding the use of fare payments, this server may either immediately send back to the RFID reader whether or not the user may pass the turnstile or the server can further process the user’s request along a supply-chain.

1. Remote supply-chain management

The supply-chain management system is indicative of any multi-step process that handles certain requests (Lehpamer, 2012). In the case for the contactless fare payment process, the supply-chain management system may be responsible for payments and fraud detection. The user may have attached their credit or debit card information to their RFID/NFC tagged device. If the server detects this and realizes that the fare on the device is not sufficient, the server may send this message along to the supply-chain management system which can then refill the device automatically. Likewise, if the server detects suspicious activity from the device, the server can pass along the devices information to the supply-chain for fraud detection. If the device is detected as being fraudulent, the system may alert the subway station officials.

Figure 6A – Home page of the myMTA App. Original screenshot production     

Figure 6B – The Extension of the MyMTA App for turnstiles. Original production

Figures 6A and 6B show our proposed revision to the myMTA App, which is currently the official app from the MTA for subway service and information. We plan to add a widget in the homepage (Figure 6A) that, when activated, leads to a screen showing something like Figure 6B, with the NFC-enabled fare account in the display. This will be detected by the RFID-equipped turnstile or vending machine through a tapping gesture, which will lead to a transaction of money or general account information.

Figure 7 – Possible NFC card for fare payment. Adapted from: https://www.nfc-tag-shop.de/en/nfc-cards/clear-nfc-cards/190/nfc-card-pvc-85-mm-x-54-mm-ntag-213-180-byte-transparent

 

The NFC card in Figure 7 serves as an alternative method of fare payment for the myMTA app extension. The card, made from durable PVC material, has a built in NFC chip that stores the monetary data associated with a user’s account for fare payment. Unlike a Metrocard, there is no magnetic strip that could easily get damaged, and the card’s data can easily be removed from the NFC chip if stolen or lost.

Figure 8A – Ticketing machine that accepts both Metrocards and contactless fare. Source: https://www.pathsmartlinkcard.com/pa_media/SmartLinkBrochure_126.pdf

Figure 8B – Potential configuration of the current Metrocard vending machine for NFC card payment. Original production

 

Figures 8A and 8B are our approach towards making Metrocard vending machines better adapted to contactless fare payments. Figure 8A shows a vending machine almost exactly like those seen in the NYC subway, but is part of the PATH subway, which uses an RFID-based technology called the SmartLink Card along with the Metrocard. The circular figure in the bottom right of Figure 8A is where the NFC card can be detected.

Figure 8B is a rough computer-aided design rendering of a Metrocard vending machine that would accept NFC payments. The basic design of the vending machine would remain the same, but a new device, shown in black, will be the location of an RFID reader, which can scan NFC chips on both electronic devices and cards.

 

Budget

Our proposed strategy for introducing NFC-enhanced fare payment to the NYC subway will cover its initial development and rollout. Therefore, our budget will largely cover the expenses of developing the mobile payment system, mass-producing the NFC card for payments, configuring the current vending machines and turnstiles for RFID equipment, and additional labor costs.

Regarding personnel, our first step is to have a crew of eight workers responsible for distributing and installing RFID technology in turnstiles across the NYC subway system. At the same time, a crew of five app developers will design an extension to the myMTA app-the official app of the MTA-for contactless fare payment.

The final budget will be based on a timeline that factors in delays and setbacks for the various processes, and will thus be spread over a period of 20 months instead of 14. Adjustments will be made for maintenance of the NFC-enhanced fare payment system and possible replacement of the MetroCard after the initial period. The labor costs will approximate to $1.8 million, the app development costs will approximate to $650,000, and the rollout of NFC cards will be approximately $750,000. In total, at the end of our timeline, it will cost around $3.63 million to implement a contactless fare payment system in the NYC subway (see Appendix A for more information).

References

A Brief History of RFID. (n.d.). Retrieved from

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~obaca/rfid/history.html

Alexander Jr., P., Baashirah, R., & Abuzneid, A. (2018). Comparison and Feasibility of Various RFID Authentication Methods Using ECC. Sensors (14248220), 18(9), 1–17.

Barron, J. (2017). New York to Replace MetroCard With Modern Way to Pay Transit Fares.

The New York Times, 167(57760).

Dig Deep – Construction of RFID Tags. (n.d.). Retrieved from

https://rfid4u.com/rfid-basics-resources/dig-deep-rfid-tags-construction/

Dig Deep – Construction of RFID Tags. (n.d.). [Figure]. Retrieved from

https://rfid4u.com/rfid-basics-resources/dig-deep-rfid-tags-construction/

Düzenli̇, G. (2015). RFID card security for public transportation applications based on a novel

neural network analysis of cardholder behavior characteristics. Turkish Journal of

Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences, 23(4), 1098–1110.

https://doi-org.ccny-proxy1.libr.ccny.cuny.edu/10.3906/elk-1306-96

Frequently Asked Questions. (n.d.). [Figure]. Retrieved from

https://www.pathsmartlinkcard.com/pa_media/SmartLinkBrochure_126.pdf

Genixx, T. (2017, October 15). How to Avoid Electronic Pick Pocketing. [Figure].

Retrieved from

https://travelgenixx.com/blogs/news/how-to-avoid-electronic-pick-pocketing

 

Hawkins, A. J. (2017, October 23). NYC is (very slowly) getting a more high-tech way to pay

for subway rides. [Figure]. Retrieved from

https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/23/16521456/nyc-mta-subway-bus-smartphone-fare

metrocard

Hilkevitch, J. (2013, December 2). What’s the risk of ‘electronic pickpocketing’ for Ventra cards?

Retrieved from

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-12-02-ct-getting-around-met-1125-

0131202-story.html

Lvqing Y., Qingqiang W., Youjing B., Huiru Z., & Shufu L. (2016). An improved

hash-based RFID two-way security authentication protocol and application in remote

education. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, 31(4), 2713–2720. https://doi-org.ccny-proxy1.libr.ccny.cuny.edu/10.3233/JIFS-169111

NFC Card PVC, 85 mm x 54 mm, NTAG 213, 180 byte, transparent. (n.d.). [Figure].

Retrieved from

https://www.nfc-tag-shop.de/en/nfc-cards/clear-nfc-cards/190/nfc-card-pvc-85-mm-x-54

mm-ntag-213-180-byte-transparent

Prevent Electronic Pickpocketing: Security Measures For RFID And NFC Credit Cards. (n.d.).

Retrieved from

https://barcode.com/20120624931/prevent-electronic-pickpocketing-security-measures-f

r-rfid-and-nfc-credit-cards.html

Schilpzand, Wouter & van ‘t Hof, Christian. (2008). RFID as the Key to the Ubiquitous Network

Society.

Turnstile Usage Data: 2016. (2015, December 29). Retrieved December 10, 2018, from https://data.ny.gov/Transportation/Turnstile-Usage-Data-2016/ekwu-khcy

How much does MTA New York City Transit pay in the United States? (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.indeed.com/cmp/Mta-New-York-City-Transit/salaries

Lehpamer, H. (2012). RFID Design Principles. 55(2).

Lehpamer, H. (2012). [Figure]. RFID Design Principles. 55(2).

Iso14443a 13.56mhz Nfc 215 Rfid Blank Card – Buy Rfid Blank Card,Nfc 215 Rfid Blank Card,Nfc 215 Product on Alibaba.com. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/ISO14443A-13-56MHz-NFC-215-RFID_60769384543.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normalList.2.17f63890KWsIb2

 

Appendices

Appendix A – Budget chart

Component	Material cost	Personnel cost	Description	Duration	Total Cost
Installing RFID technology onto turnstiles and vending machines	$0.3897 for an RFID reader from NXP	Average salary for NYC subway mechanic at $31 per hour	Materials: 8,000 RFID readers to be purchased Personnel: 8-hour shifts for two workers at two turnstiles, and 8 workers for 4 boroughs 7 days a week during late nights and weekend days	Throughout the 20-month timeline (simultaneous with other components of the project)	$1,785,600 for labor costs only, $3117.60 for RFID readers Total: $1,788,717.60
Development of extension to myMTA app for mobile fare payment	Personnel cost only	Average annual salary of developer at $150,000	Crew of 5 1 leader 1 designer 2 programmers 1 manager Release beta versions of app extension across RFID-enabled turnstiles within timeline to fix software bugs and errors	Throughout the 20-month project timeline	$650,000
NFC cards	$0.50 per card	None	For 20 month timeline, release 500,000 new NFC cards every 6 months Ca	Every 6 months, continue after end of project	$750,000 for the project timeline
Total cost of the project					$3.63 million

 

Appendix B – Gantt chart